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Abstract - Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a major issue for the availability of internet services. The
vast number of insecure machines available in the Internet provides a fertile ground for attackers to
compromise them and create attack zombies. Attack , mitigation and traceback of perpetrators is extremely
difficult due to a large number of attacking machines, the use of source-address spoofing or modifying IP
address and the similarity between legitimate and attack traffic.  IP traceback has been proposed where one
attempts to reconstruct the entire attack path, the attack packets have traversed or focusing only on the
source of attack packets, no matter which path they take for assault. IP Traceback (IPT) based on the
geographical information, rather than the traditional IP address information, has come to vogue. In this
paper Multi positional view and Multi management IP Traceback mechanism for defense against Distributed
Denial of Service attacks”, has been addressed. This paper proposes a Multi dimensional representation with
d(n) directions, where d(n) is the neighborhood direction ratio set generating function using the Angle based
Reckoning Process (ARP) and also mitigates the Impossibility of ensuring adequate space in the packet
header during its flight, by the Angle based Reckoning Sampling Process. To demonstrate the entire process
and analytically simulate that the proposed mechanism react quickly blocking attack traffic while achieving
high survival ratio for legitimate traffic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An important and challenging problem is that of
tracing DoS/DDoS attack source. IP traceback is the
process of identifying the actual sources of attack, so
that the attackers can be held accountable and
mitigating the attacks, either by isolating the attack
sources, or by filtering packets far away from the
victim. The method of direction based segment ratio
(DBSR) scheme to overcome the directional
limitations of 23 DGT is proposed. A two
dimensional square grid with routers at selected grid
points is made. Figure 1.1 focus the edge between 2
routers is thus a line in two dimensions, whose
directions are specified by its direction cosines (Cos
α, Cos β) where α, β are the angles which the line of
the routers makes with axes of reference OE, ON
where E is the east and N is the north direction.
Cos2 α + Cos2 β = 1
Figure 1.1 Router edge Ra Rb direction
cosines Cos α, Cos β)
Figure 1.2 edge between routers A and B with DBSR =
(x2- x1, y2- y1)
Figure 1.2 segment it can be found that the edge AB
between 2 adjacent routers, with coordinate A (x1, y1)and B (x2, y2) with respect to OE, ON axes ofreference. The coordinates are in units of the grid
size. Direction based segment ratio (DBSR)   of AB
is (x2- x1, y2- y1) where | x2- x1 |, | y2- y1| ≤ 2 and co-primes. It is easy to see that (x2- x1, y2- y1) are onlythe grid steps to be taken in the ±OE, ±ON directions
to reach B from A. They are the projections of the
edge AB on OE, ON with appropriate sign
attached.For the choice of | x2- x1 |, | y2- y1| ≤ 2 thereare 16 directions possible called D1 to D32 where D1,D5, D9, D13 directions are respectively OE, ON, OW
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and OS directions. Table 1.1 also gives the summary
of the DBSR bits of the 32 directions D1 to D32.
Table 1.1 Direction 32 DBSR in decimal and
binary forms
Direction D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
D (0,1) (3,1) (2,1) (3,2) (1,1) (2,3)
B (00,01) (11,01) (10,01) (11,10) (01,01) (10,11)
Direction D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12
D (2,1) (1,3) (0,1) (-1,3) (-2,1) (-2,3)
B (10,01) (01,00) (00,01) (-
01,11)
(-
10,01)
(-
10,11)
Direction D13 D14 D15 D16 D17 D18
D (-1,1) (-3,2) (-2,1) (-3,1) (0,-1) (-1,-3)
B (-
01,01)
(-
11,10)
(-
10,01)
(-
11,01)
(00,-
01)
(-01,-
11)
Direction D19 D20 D21 D22 D23 D24
D (-2,-1) (-2,-3) (-1,-1) (-3,-2) (-2,-1) (-3,-1)
B (-10,-
01)
(-10,-
11)
(-01,-
01)
(-11,-
01)
(-11,-
01)
(-11,-
01)
Direction D25 D26 D27 D28 D29 D30
D (0,-1) (1,-3) (2,-1) (2,-3) (1,-1) (3,-2)
B (00,-
01)
(01,-
11)
(10,-
01)
(10,-
11)
(01,-
01)
(11,-
10)
Direction D31 D32
D (2,-1) (3,-1)
B (11,-
01)
(11,-
01)
A. Differential interface limitation
A limitation of DGT 32 is the inequality
(though marginal) among the interfaces. But, this is
the cost one has to pay to satisfy the integer
requirements of the DBSR and for generalization to
2n DGT. 2n DGT scheme and its generalization
below remove only the directional limitations. The
dimensional limitations still exist. Specifically 2n
DGT restricts DBSR of segment joining A (x1, y1)and B (x2, y2) to the constraint | x2- x1 |, | y2- y1| ≤ n-2and co-primes. Ultimately the number n of the
scheme DGT 2n depends on the IP header bit capacity
as is evident from Table 1.2. Though the directional
constraint of DGT is eliminated by the concept of
DBSR, the dimensional constraint remains.
Table 1.2 2n DGT specifications
n 2n
DBSR
bit
length
Max step
moves on
grid
Max
Count
DBSR
value
IP header
Count DBSR
length
3 8 1 1 32 two(1+6)
4 16 2 2 64 two(1+7)
5 32 3 3 96 two(1+7)
6 64 4 4 128 two(1+8)
II   ARP (ANGLE BASED RECKONING
PROCESS)
During a packet’s flight, each router
appends Di, the direction ratio of the successor routerRi from it. As it reaches the victim, from the suffix ofthe packet w, the Direction Ratio List (DRL) is
extracted so as to spot the attacker. The serious
limitation of ARP is the impossibility of ensuring
adequate unused space in the packet header during its
flight. This problem cannot be eliminated. It can be
addressed by modifying the algorithm used. The
Angle based Reckoning Sampling Process (ARSP)
was proposed for managing the deficiency in packet
header space.
A. ARSP Traceback Basics
It requires an address field (R), a
direction ratio field (DR) and a distance field (S), in
the packet header to implement this algorithm.
Assuming that the IP header has (16 + 8 + 1) = 25
bits, for MRSP, 10 bits each for the address field &
the DR field and 5 bits for the distance field was
allotted. This is acceptable since the routers are
numbered serially. The 10 bit field can accommodate
the last 3 digits of the serial number and is sufficient
for RN (mod 1000) where RN is the router number.
Also a 9 bits are sufficient for d(2) (=49) members,
and 10 bits are sufficient for the DR field. Since any
IP path never exceeds 32 hops, a 5 bit distance field
is sufficient and the layout is shown in Figure 2.1.
10 10 5
RN mod (1000) DR (a, b, c) S
R Field (RF) DR Field(DRF)
Distance Field
(SF)
Figure 2.1 IP header format for ARSP
Here RN is the router number of router Ri at (xi, yi,zi) and Dj is the d.r (aj, bj, cj) Є d(2) of the successorrouter Rj from Ri. Note that Ri (Dj) = Rj and byuniqueness theorem, there is One-to-One
V.Shyamaladevi* et al. / (IJITR) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH
Volume No. 1, Issue No. 4, June - July 2013, 298 - 303.
ISSN  2320 –5547 @ 2013 http://www.ijitr.com All rights Reserved. Page | 300
correspondence between Dj (from Ri) and successorRj.
B. Angle based Reckoning Sampling Process
The marking procedure at a router Ri ofevery packet w from the attacker is as follows. Let x
be a random number in (0, 1) and p, a chosen
probability level. If x < p, then if the packet is
unmarked, then write RN (mod 1000) of the router in
the RF, Di in DRF, and 0 in SF. Otherwise, if thepacket is already marked or x ≥ p, then only
increment the distance field SF. After sufficient
number of samples are drawn, then using the property
Ri (Dj) = Rj and the distance field count, the attackpath can be reconstructed. The victim uses the DRF,
sampled data along with RF, in these packets to
create a graph, leading to the source (s) of the attack.
III PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
If they constrain p to be identical at
each router, then the probability of receiving a
marked packet, from a router d hops away is p (1-p)d-
1 and this function is monotonic in the distance
variable d from the victim. Because the probability of
receiving a sample is geometrically smaller, the
farther away it is from the victim, the time of this
algorithm to converge is dominated by the time to
receive a sample from the furthest router. Let us
assume that samples from all of the d routers, in the
path from A to V, appear with the same likelihood as
the furthest router. Since these probabilities are
disjoint i.e. mutually exclusive, the probability that a
given packet will deliver a sample from some router
is at least dp (1-p) d-1, by addition law of mutually
exclusive events. The number of trials required to
select one of each of d equiprobable victims, is d
(ln(d)) + O(1) Therefore, the number of packets X,
required by the victim to reconstruct a path of length
d, has the bounded expectation,
d 1
ln (d)E(x) p(1 p)  
(2.1)From (2.1) it is known that E(x) is optimally
minimum for
1p d Since
dE 0dp 
and 2
2
d E 0dp 
for 1p d
p .
Thus min 2
d 1
d ln(d)(E(x)) k(d 1)  
for 1p d , where d is the attack path length and hence
the victim can typically reconstruct the path after
receiving k packets. For d =10, k ≤ 75 and hence the
victim can typically reconstruct the path after
receiving 75 packets from the attacker. This same
algorithm can discern efficiently, multiple attacks
also. When attackers from different sources, produce
disjoint edges in the tree structure of reconstruction,
the number of packets needed to construct each path
is independent of other paths. The limitations
imposed by restricting the number of directions at a
router to d(2) at every stage and using RN (mod
1000) instead of the full serial number of the router
are marginal in nature. Hence ARSP is a robust
scheme of Multi position viewed and Multi
management IP Traceback.
IV DEPLOYMENT
The scale of a DDoS network is too
large to be recreated in a simulation environment and
hence an attack topology was designed to allow
variations in a number of different dimensions. The
number of attacking machines in a DDoS attack was
varied between one to six attack nodes. The distance
between the source attack machine and the targeted
victim was varied from a minimum of three hops to a
maximum of 12 hops with a Connection Delay of
1sec per hop. Intermediate routers in the network
were set to default CISCO generic type and switches
were of either manageable or auto configurable types.
The Bandwidth was automatically configured by the
packet tracer to its default value. Both Routing
Information Protocol (RIP1) and ICMP were used as
the Supportive protocol. The Topologies used in
the depicted network involved star, mesh, hybrid,
tree, ring and bus. The range of the Attack Level was
categorized as low, medium and high depending on
the volume of packet generated and sent to the victim
machine.
A. Simulation Topology 1
Due to the large volume of packets and
the scale of the network involved in a DDoS attack, it
is highly difficult to simulate a complete DDoS
attack scenario in any simulator. This article utilizes
three different environments involving a simplified
topology to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed mechanisms rather than a depiction of a
complete DDoS attack. Figure 4.1 shows the first
topology with one attack source machine and a
victim with 3  generic intermediate routers and 2
manageable switches placed on a 16 directional and 2
dimensional grid environment. The star topology is
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used with a 3 hop distance from source to victim. The
bandwidth was auto configured with a default
connection delay of 1 sec/hop. As the packet is
forwarded through the depicted network, the DGT
enabled routers mark the packet with the traceback
information in the ID field of the IP header of the
packet. In Figure 4.1, If R14(Router 14), R16(Router
16) is the edge joining 2 routers R14, R16 with
coordinates of R14(x1, y1) and R16(x2, y2) then
SDR (Segment Direction Ratio) of R14, R16 are
defined as (x2 - x1, y2 - y1) where |x2-x1|, |y2-y1| ≤
2 and co primes. In general for DGTof  2n directions
we handle SDR with |x2-x1|, |y2-y1| ≤ (n-2), and co
primes for n ≥ 3.  It is easy to see that (x2 - x1),
(y2 - y1) are only the grid steps to be taken in ± OE,
± ON directions, to reach R16 from R14. They are
the projections of the edge R14, R16 on OE, ON with
appropriate sign attached. Figure 4.2 shows the
Second topology comprising an attack scenario with
two simultaneous attack sources and a victim. 3
CISCO generic intermediate routers and 2
manageable switches were placed on a 16 directional
and 2 dimensional grid environment. The star
topology is used with a 3 hop distance from Source 1
(PC5) to Victim and a 4 hop distance from Source 2
(PC9) to Victim.
Figure 4.1 source machine and destination
machine
Figure 4.2 comprising an attack scenario with
different simultaneous attack sources and a victim
The bandwidth was auto configured with a default
connection delay of 1 sec/hop ICMP was again used
as the support protocol to analyze the path traversed
by the packet in the simulator. Figure 4.3 shows the
details of two packets traversing from source
machines PC5 and PC9 to victim machine PC3
determined using the ICMP support protocols.
Figure 4.3 The packet details at victim for
the next topology
Packet leaves Source machine 1 - PC 5 at 0.000s.
Packet from Source machine 1 - PC 5 passes through
Switch 6 at 0.001s and reaches Router 16 at 0.002s.
From Router 16 the packet is forwarded to Router14
at 0.003s From Router 14 the packet is then
forwarded to router12 at 0.004s. From Router 12 the
packet finally reaches Switch 3 at 0.005s. From
Switch 3 the packet finally reaches PC 3 at 0.006s.
Similarly the packet from Source machine 2 - PC9
traverses through Switch9 to Switch3 with four
intermediate hops at Router10, Router9, Router14
and Router12 and finally reaches PC3 at 0.007s from
Switch3. Figure 6.10 also shows the start of the
return packet from PC3 to PC5 being sent to Switch3
at 0.007s.
B. Simulation Topology 2
Figure 4.4 shows the Third topology
comprising an attack scenario with six simultaneous
attack sources - PC0, PC1, PC2, PC4, PC5 and PC9
and a victim PC3. Here eight CISCO generic
intermediate routers and 12 Manageable switches
were placed on a 16 directional and 2 dimensional
grid environment. The star topology is used with
different hop distances from source to victim. The
bandwidth was auto configured with a default
connection delay of 1 sec/hop. The simulation was
run for 200 seconds with different attack rate
(number of packets sent per second) for the six
source machines. ICMP was used as the support
protocol. Figure 4.5 shows six packets being sent
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from the six source machines and the packets
reaching the switches at 0.001s. The complete
simulation panel shown gives the details of the actual
path traversed by the packet from source to
destination. Figure 4.6 shows the details of the
packets from 6 Source machines traversing the
various components in the network and reaching the
Victim machine PC3.
Figure 4.4 The third topology with 6 attack source
machine and a victim
Figure 4.5 The details of the packets sent from
6 Source machines
Figure 4.6 The details of the packets from 6 Source
machines traversing the various components
network and reaching the Victim machine PC3
V CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
The SRP between any two points (x1,y1),(x2,y2) in two dimensions are defined as (x2-x1,y2-y1)where, for limited directions.| x2- x1 | ,| y2- y1| ≤ 1 andco primes, and for n directions.| x2- x1 | ,| y2- y1| ≤ 2and co primes ,and for up to 2n directions.
| x2- x1 | ,| y2- y1| ≤ n-2 and co primes where n ≤ N aset of natural numbers, for n > N. The importance of
SRP lies in the fact that it can be generalized easily to
higher order of direction. Also the two elements
being in integers are represent able as bits which is
vital for marking / processing purposes which enables
the traceback. These properties are made N
directional, limited dimensional traceback is possible.
The DGT of maximum dimensions, the problem of
paucity of adequate header space in packets is
addressed using the statistical theory of random
sampling. The fixed header space of 25 bits is
assumed for every packet. Trifurcated into 10 + 10 +
5 to accommodate the R (mod 1000 ) for the serial
number R of the router, the elements (a,b,c) of
direction Di and the hop count, all in bits. Of course,construction of the traceback path is possible only
after sufficient numbers of samples are drawn. This is
true for any “statistical method” which means that
“the conclusions are true only when the random
experiment is repeated a number of times”.
The minimum number of packets needed for
reconstruction of a path of d hops for a choice of
1p d is given by,
2
d 1
d ln (d)k (d 1)   which gives
k = 75 for d = 10. The packet header space
limitation has been overcome by superior
management using Management Reckoning
Sampling Process. Though this article has been
successful in overcoming the directional and
dimensional constraints and header space constraints,
by the use of sampling theorem.
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